Color is not a property of objects in isolation, but a feature of our linguistic and perceptual organization of the world.
Color is not an intrinsic property of an object, but a result of the way we categorize and distinguish between objects within a shared linguistic and sensory framework.
This text is a foundational precursor to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language. It solves the "problem of the given"—the naive assumption that we can perceive the world directly without any prior conceptual framework. It is for philosophers, cognitive scientists, and anyone interested in how human perception is structured by language and social convention. After reading this, you will be able to see why "pure" perception is a myth and how our categories (like "red" or "blue") actually shape what we are capable of seeing.
Wittgenstein argues against the "naive realist" view that colors are inherent qualities of objects, like weight or size. Instead, he argues that color is a relational property. We only recognize a color as such because we have a system of distinctions. For example, we only see "red" because we have a concept of "not-red" (which includes blue, green, and yellow).
The logic follows that perception is a "judgment." When we see a red apple, we aren't just receiving a raw sensory input; we are identifying the apple as belonging to the category of "red." This identification is only possible because we have a pre-existing "grammar" of color. If you were to strip away all linguistic and conceptual categories, the "color" of the object would effectively vanish, leaving only a raw, undifferentiated sensation that we cannot name or categorize.
Therefore, color is a product of our organization of the world. We do not see the world as it is; we see the world as our conceptual categories allow us to see it.
To understand how we perceive any category (not just color), use this mental model:
Wittgenstein explains that we recognize a color by its relation to others. If you see a red object, you recognize it as red because it is not blue. Lesson: Perception is defined by what it excludes.
The author suggests that our ability to see "red" is tied to our ability to say "red." Without the word, the sensation remains a nameless, un-categorized experience. Lesson: Language is the scaffolding of our sensory experience.
"Color is not a property of the object, but a property of our perception of the object." (Paraphrased) Why it matters: It moves the source of reality from the external world to the internal observer.
"We see a color only because we have a system of distinctions." (Paraphrased) Why it matters: It highlights that our "reality" is a structured system, not a collection of raw facts.
"The meaning of a color is its place in the system of colors." (Paraphrased) Why it matters: It defines meaning as relational and systemic rather than inherent.
Reflection questions
Flashcards Q: Is color an inherent property of an object according to Wittgenstein? A: No, it is a property of our perception and our system of distinctions.
Q: How do we recognize a color? A: By its relation to other colors (e.g., recognizing red because it is not blue).
Q: What is the role of language in "Bemerkungen über die Farben"? A: Language provides the conceptual grid that allows us to categorize and identify sensory experiences.
Q: What does Wittgenstein mean by the "system of distinctions"? A: The idea that we only see a thing because we have a system that excludes everything else that is not that thing.
Q: Is perception a "pure" experience? A: No, perception involves a "judgment" or a categorization based on prior concepts.
I have a high level of confidence in the conceptual framework of this summary. Wittgenstein's early work on color is a staple of his philosophical development. However, because this is a short, early essay, the specific "technical" vocabulary he uses can be dense. I have prioritized the philosophical implications (the "why") over a literal, line-by-line translation of his German syntax. Readers should verify the specific "not-blue" examples in the text to see his exact phrasing.
Bemerkungen über die FarbenLudwig Wittgenstein
Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-1935Ludwig Wittgenstein
Letters to Russell, Keynes, and MooreLudwig Wittgenstein
Notebooks, 1914-1916Ludwig Wittgenstein
On certainty =Ludwig Wittgenstein
Philosophical InvestigationsLudwig Wittgenstein
Philosophische BemerkungenLudwig Wittgenstein
Philosophische UntersuchungenLudwig Wittgenstein
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1 (Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology)Ludwig Wittgenstein
Tractatus logico-philosophicusLudwig Wittgenstein